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Twenty sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFRs) have provided valuable experience in design,
licensing, and operation. This paper summarizes the important safety criteria and safety
guidelines of intermediate sodium systems, steam generators, decay heat removal systems
and associated construction materials and in-service inspection. The safety criteria and
guidelines provide a sufficient framework for design and licensing, in particular by new
entrants in SFRs.
Copyright © 2015, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society.1. Introduction
Twenty sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFRs) were in operation
between 1951 and 2014 in nine different countries, with a
total combined operation time of over 420 years. Presently,
SFRs are in operation in China, India, and Russia. SFRs are
now also in different stages of design and development ind under the terms of the
ich permits unrestricted
cited.
sevier Korea LLC on behaChina, France, India, Russia, and South Korea. Valuable
operating experience has been accumulated and this feed-
back is being utilized in designing a new reactor [1,2]. SFRs
are favored choices for sustainability of nuclear energy and
high level waste management through incineration of minor
actinides and long-lived fission products. SFRs are one of the
strongest options for Gen IV reactors. To start with, when theCreative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://
non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any me-
lf of Korean Nuclear Society.
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example by South Korea, it is necessary to prepare a safety
criteria document incorporating the basic safety objectives of
nuclear power plants, feedback from meetings on specific
topics of the International/Technical Working Group on Fast
Reactors, lessons learnt from other types of reactors, in
particular the Fukushima accident, related aspects from the
safety criteria of SFRs of other countries and safety design
criteria for Gen IV sodium-cooled fast reactor systems [3,4].
The safety criteria of SFRs take inspiration from the safety
criteria of thermal reactors (as applicable). However, one also
faces the issues of relevance to thermal reactors during
technical discussions with regard to licensing of SFRs, as a
large number of experts have a background in thermal
reactors.
This paper attempts to define safety criteria and safety
guidelines of intermediate heat transport systems, steam
generation systems, decay heat removal systems, associated
construction materials, and in-service inspection aspects of
SFRs. Safety criteria concerning general requirements in
evolving a safe design are bullet marked in the text. Safety
guidelines, design recommendations, and suggestions tomeet
safety criteria are also examined.2. Physical and chemical properties of
sodium and impact on design
The physical and chemical properties of sodium have a strong
influence on the safety design aspects of SFRs. The high
boiling point of 883C, high thermal conductivity, and low
viscosity are conducive to nuclear decay heat removal by
natural convection. The freezing temperature of sodium
(98C) imposes preheating requirements on sodium systems,
along with measures to prevent freezing during various
reactor operation modes and in particular during decay heat
removal. It also allows ease of leak tightness requirements
towards the exterior for sodium frozen seal valves and ease in
maintenance and repairs.
The most important concern arising from sodium as a
coolant is its high chemical reactivity. It burns in air leading
to fire, and reacts violently with water. Thus the safety as-
pects of dealing with sodium leaks and sodium-heated steam
generators are among the most challenging aspects of
designing SFRs. The strong interaction of sodium with water
and air calls for incorporation of an intermediate sodium
circuit from the safety aspects of the reactor core, and double
wall piping with the interspace inerted in the primary so-
dium piping of a loop type primary circuit configuration. In
some reactor designs, the double wall arrangement is also
extended to the intermediate system to avoid risks associ-
ated with sodium fires.
The high operating temperatures of SFRs in comparison
with light water reactors (LWRs), the excellent thermal con-
ductivity of sodium, coupled with high temperature differ-
ences across the reactor core and heat exchangers have a
strong bearing on the mechanical design aspects of creep due
to high temperature usage, thermal fatigue, thermal striping,
and stratification under different modes of reactor operation.
The low pressure in the sodium systems, sodium leakdetection provisions, and usage of ductile materials allow
adoption of the leak before break concept.3. Safety criteria and safety guidelines
3.1. Intermediate heat transport system (IHTS)
Important system related safety criteria along with associated
guidelines that are relevant to intermediate heat transport
systems (IHTSs) are discussed below.
Safety criteria
 An intermediate heat transport circuit shall be interposed
between the primary sodium circuit and the steam-water
circuit.
Safety guidelinesThe need for an intermediate circuit is to avoid sodium
water reaction products from entering the core thereby risk-
ing reactivity perturbations and plugging of the narrow pas-
sages in the core cooling path.
 The pressure in the intermediate sodium circuit (IHTS)
at the intermediate heat exchanger shall be higher
than the primary sodium so that any tube leak results
in flow of secondary sodium to radioactive primary
sodium.
 Sodium systems shall be designed with reliability to pre-
vent sodium leaks, in particular, large leaks.
Safety guidelines
The design of sodium components and piping should be
designed for safe shutdown earthquake (and operating basis
earthquake) irrespective of safety classification to avoid large
sodium fires.
 The design of sodium systems should identify potential
locations of thermal striping and be designed accordingly.
 An all-welded construction should be used. Socketwelds in
piping should not be used.
 Unless proven by equivalent life cycle tests, the use of
bellows for piping flexibility should be avoided.
Safety criteria
 Sodium leakages and fires shall be detected and located
with adequate reliability and provisions shall be made to
minimize the amount of sodium leaking and the risk of
resulting fires.
 The heat transport items important to safety shall be
independent, redundant and physically separate from
each other to prevent common cause and cross-linked
failures.
 The IHTS and its components shall be designed to with-
stand themaximum credible transient pressure associated
with various design basis events (e.g., sodium water
reaction).
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detect and to identify the location of sodium leaks.
Safety guidelines
 The design of sodium components and piping should be
aimed so as to reduce the sodium inventory with due
consideration to life cycle economics.
 Single failure proof cranes should be adopted to avoid the
risk of accidentally dropping heavy objects on the sodium
piping and components.
 Design should aim for “leak before break” and it should be
substantiated. An increase in sodium pressure through
increased cover gas pressure could be needed to fulfil the
design objective of “leak before break”.
 Diverse systems should be provided to detect sodium
leaks.
 A provision should be made for the fast dumping of the
sodium circuit into the dump tank considering single fail-
ure criteria. The dumping time should not be more than 15
minutes.
 Passive means should be adopted to reduce the quantity of
burnt sodium.
 Consideration should be given to automation in sodium
fire extinguishing.
 The sodium systems and components located in the
Reactor Containment Building (RCB) should not result in a
secondary sodium leak leading to fire. Double wall con-
struction of piping with interspace filled with inert gas or
single wall piping and components placed in inerted cells
should be used for the secondary circuit located in the RCB.
The use of double wall piping outside the RCB, though ideal
for design prevention of sodium fires, could be avoided in
well proven designs to provide an economical design.
 The insulation material should be compatible with
austenitic stainless steel in case of any water seepage
through the insulation, and interaction with sodium
should not aggravate the consequences of sodium leaks.
 Sodium compatible concrete or steel liners should be
incorporated to minimize sodium concrete reactions.
Safety criteria
 The purity of sodium, its associated cover gas system, and
water in the steam generators shall be maintained within
design limits to minimize sodium corrosion and load on
the cold traps.
 The environmental norms for release of sodium aerosols in
terms of sodium hydroxide and sodium carbonate for
design sodium leaks shall be respected at the site boundary.
 “Design basis flood” design parameters shall be deter-
mined with adequatemargins, or designmeasures shall be
provided, so that there is no risk of external water entry
near sodium systems, in particular sodium dump tanks
located at the lowest elevation.
 Repair of sodium components shall ensure the best
possiblemeans to reduce air entry into the sodium systems
and shall be qualified.
 Re-qualification of sodium components and piping subse-
quent to a large sodium fire shall be performed.3.2. Intermediate heat exchanger
The safety objective of intermediate heat exchangers (IHXs) is
to isolate the radioactive primary sodium from the interme-
diate sodium through the tubes in the IHX. It is primarily a
shell and tube heat exchanger. There are a number of design
variants. These include primary sodium in the shell or tube
side, with or without integration of a decay heat removal heat
exchanger tube to tube sheet joint of rolled andwelded or only
welded with a number of its variants, means of accommoda-
ting differential expansion between tubes and tube bundle
and shell, and with variants in material of construction, etc.
The operating experience of IHX could be termed excellent
except for a number of incidents in Phenix [5]. The incidents of
secondary sodium leaks in Phenix were due to a design
drawback attributed to lack of complete understanding of the
thermal hydraulics of the secondary sodium outlet header,
causing significant thermal tensile loading on the inner shell
leading to cracking at the weld location. A number of
modifications were incorporated in the repaired and new
heat exchangers of Phenix. The lessons learned, which led to
evolving a satisfactory design for IHX, demonstrated during
operation of Superphenix. The thermal loading of the
secondary sodium outlet header increases with the rating of
the heat exchangers due to the increased number of tube
rows and hence, the performance of lower rated prototypes is
no guarantee for the performance of large units.
Safety criteria
 The applicable safety criteria are derived from the clauses
mentioned in Section 3.1.
Safety guidelines
The structural integrity check should include thermal
loading at the secondary sodium outlet header based on
detailed thermal hydraulics analysis. Design measures to
reduce this thermal loading by a thermal mixer and/or bel-
lows or variable flow distribution tominimize thermal loading
could be incorporated.3.3. Steam generator system
Operating experience with sodium heated steam generators
has demonstrated that this component holds the key to the
plant availability factor. All the single-wall steam generators in
power reactors which have operated for a significant time have
suffered tube leaks. The British Prototype Fast Reactor (PFR) had
avery lowplant capacity factorbecauseofanumberof tube leak
events. The concern for the incompatibility of sodium and
water/steam has led to a number of design variants by
replacement of the water/steam Rankine cycle by a gas-based
Brayton cycle; a double-walled SG with metallurgical/mechan-
ical bonded tubes, and separation of water/steam and sodium
systems by an intermediate heat transfer medium compatible
with both water/steam and sodium (for example
leadebismuth). Nevertheless, the steam generators of sodium-
cooled power reactors built so far have single-walled tubes. The
consensus among the experts has not yet converged on the
“best design” of single-wall steamgenerators. Steamgenerators
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reactor have also been conceived, and designs ranging from
modular tomonolithic steam generators have been operated or
planned in a few countries (France and Russia).
Safety criteria
Important safety criteria in particular for single-walled
steam generators are:
 Steam generators and associated circuits shall be designed
so as to minimize the probability of water/steam leakage
and to limit the consequences resulting from sodiume-
water/steam reactions.
Safety guidelines
 Tube to tubesheet welds are the most probable leak loca-
tion and thus have a strong influence on the reliability of
steam generators. State of the art welding techniques like
internal bore weld, and joint configuration to permit heat
treatment and volumetric examination are suitable op-
tions to overcome this drawback. Butt welds should be
adopted at the hot end of the steam generator with the
above objectives and to reduce stress concentration.
 Designs with tube configuration with significant cross flow
through the tube bundle should be avoided to avoid the risk
of tube failure by flow induced vibration.
 Design codes do provide rules for exemption of postweld
heat treatment on CreMo steels. These exemptions should
be taken with caution as the codes do not consider envi-
ronmental effects like stress corrosion cracking.
Safety criteria
 Provisions shall be made to detect water/steam leaks into
sodium with very high reliability and sensitivity.
Safety guidelines
 Tube leak detection systems should not be bypassed in
operation, in case a large sodium water/steam reaction
could impact the plant.
 Adequate instrumentation should be provided to confirm
the leak, and online identification of the leaking module in
case of modular design of the steam generators.
 The response time should beminimized byminimizing the
transit time to the detectors.
Safety criteria
 Provisions shall bemade to safeguard the sodiumassociated
systems against mediumwater/steam leaks into sodium.
 Provisions shall be made to safeguard the sodium associ-
ated systems against large sodium water reactions by
incorporation of reliable and fast response rupture discs.
Safety guidelines
 Use of reverse buckling rupture discs is recommended
as they are less affected by aging and have a lowerfrequency of replacement compared with other
designs.
Safety criteria
 The IHX boundary should be designed with level C of
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) or an
equivalent code for loading resulting from design basis
leaks providing a cushion for beyond design basis leaks
with level D loading.
Safety guidelines
 One does not need to take a pessimistic view of the design
of intermediate sodium systems for water/steam pressure
or rupture of all the tubes of a single steam generator once
the design has considered small, medium, and large leak
events.
Safety criteria
 The tube design shall provide a means for periodic in-ser-
vice inspection.
Safety guidelines
 The tube material, inside diameter, and tube configuration
influence the eddy current inspection.
 Subsequent to confirmation of a leaking tube, the adjoining
tubes should undergo eddy current inspection to decide on
the need for plugging of these tubes due to impingement
wastage.
 Periodic inspection should be performed and provisions to
inspect each tube in a speedier manner should be incor-
porated in the design.
Safety criteria
 The steam generator shall be checked for stability for all
modes of operation.
Safety guidelines
 A pressure drop arrangement at the water inlet side to
meet the pressure drop needs for all conditions of opera-
tion with due consideration of erosion of the orifice should
be incorporated.
Safety criteria
 Single failure criteria shall be applied to protection mea-
sures of active systems such as nitrogen injection systems
provided to inert the tubes after depressurization of the
steam generators.
 The design shall consider the protection measures against
tube leaks at peripheral locations leading to shell damage
by impingement wastage leading to a sodiumewatereair
reaction.
Safety guidelines
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generator buildings.
 The layout should be such that sodium and water/steam
lines are separated as far as possible.
 There should be separate buildings for housing steam
generators of each loop.3.4. Decay heat removal system
The Fukushima accident is a reminder of the importance of
decay heat removal systems. A number of design variants have
been adopted in existing reactors and some are presently in the
design stage. Decay heat removal via water-steam circuits,
steam generators, intermediate sodium circuits, primary so-
dium pools, and water cooling around safety vessels in isola-
tion or in combination have been utilized. A few trends are
quite clear for decay heat removal systems, such asminimizing
the safety systems, and a preference for heat rejection from the
reactor pool to air as the ultimate heat sink for pool type SFRs.
Safety criteria
 Diverse methods should be adopted for the removal of
decay heat from the reactor core to an ultimate heat sink in
all states of the reactor including accidents with the core in
a degraded state.
The design of the decay heat removal system shall meet
the following requirements:
 The reliability shall be defined in measure with the prob-
ability target of a hypothetical core accident.
 The design limits for fuel, fuel cladding and other struc-
tures important to safety, and sodium for different cate-
gories of events shall not be exceeded.
 Suitable diversity and redundancy shall be provided in the
design.
 The single failure criterion shall be considered in the
design.
 Periodic testing of each system shall be possible and it
should be possible to evaluate its performance against the
design parameters.
 A combination of passive and active systems shall be
employed with further possibility of active systems to
operate in passive mode with reduced capability.
 It should be designed for indefinite station black out.
 It should be designed to withstand extreme weather con-
ditions of strong wind and cyclones.
 Freezing of sodium should be avoided by suitable design
provisions.
Safety guidelines Automatic initiation of the decay heat removal system
should be adopted.
 Provisions should be made in the design analysis for non-
functioning of automatic system of the decay heat removal
system and accordingly a manual system (opening of
dampers) should also be provided for in the design. Experimental verification, in particular of the passive
decay heat removal system, on a full scale or scaled down
model should be performed.
 Adequate instrumentation should be provided to ensure
that the decay heat removal system is functioning as per
design conditions.
 At least one of the decay heat removal systems should be
based on heat rejection from the reactor primary system to
air as the ultimate heat sink.
 The sodium circulation in the passive decay heat removal
system in the desired condition should be ensured (by crack
opening of dampers on the air side and instrumentation).
 There should be provisions to isolate the decay heat
removal system in case sodium temperatures representa-
tive of the coolest tubes of the sodiumeair heat exchanger
fall below a specified value to avoid freezing of sodium.
 The layout of the decay heat removal circuits, and in
particular the stacks, should be separated to the extent
possible. The height of the stacks may be different.
 Regarding economics and plant availability, the number of
decay heat removal systems should not be too high, to
utilize every possible system for decay heat removal. For
example, three systems comprising of operational grade
heat removal through a wateresteam system, safety grade
heat rejected from the reactor pool to air as a heat sink, and
a system through the pool for core cooling under core melt
down condition should be adequate.
3.5. Construction materials
A number of sodium leaks and cracks in sodium components,
piping, and steam generator tube leaks in the reactors and
sodium test facilities could be attributed to improper choice of
material for the design temperature, material behavior of
normal conditions such as small leaks in the steam generator
causing concern for caustic stress corrosion cracking of
austenitic stainless steel for superheaters and reheaters,
environmental conditions of storage and manufacturing in
coastal sites causing concern for chloride stress corrosion
cracking, and manufacturing deficiencies such as not
executing preheating and postweld heat treatment in CreMo
steels in the steam generator [1,2].The quality of water for
hydrotests in the case of austenitic stainless steel components
and piping, and drying after hydrotests are also important to
avoid incidents of pitting and leaks during operation.
Safety criteria
 In the selection of materials and related manufacturing
specifications, consideration should be given to the mate-
rial inclusion in the design codes, material compatibility
under normal and abnormal conditions, temperature of
operation and risk of reheat cracking, mass transfer,
thermal aging and associated risk of brittle fracture,
salinity at the reactor site and component manufacturing
location, and storage.
Safety guidelines
 Stabilized austenitic stainless steels should not be used
because of the risk of sodium leaks and cracks due to
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in ASME code NH and RCC-MR.
 Low carbon nitrogen strengthened grades SS 304LN and
316LN should be preferred over SS304 and 316 grades
depending on the design temperature conditions.
 Austenitic stainless steels should not be used for the su-
perheater and reheater due to the risk of caustic stress
corrosion cracking subsequent to a water/steam leak.
 Austenitic stainless steels should not be used for
sodiumeair heat exchangers of decay heat removal in
coastal sites due to the risk of chloride stress corrosion
cracking.
 Caution should be exercised in making use of exemptions
given in the codes for postweld heat treatment for CreMo
steels.
 Although sodium does not the attack sensitized structure
of austenitic stainless steel, a risk exists of chloride stress
corrosion cracking in sensitized stainless steel in a coastal
environment. The grade and material specification should
ensure the structure of austenitic stainless steel is free of
sensitization in the delivered component.
 The material specifications should be restricted as given in
ASME code NH for SS304 and 316 grades to provide better
performance in terms of mean strength consistent with or
better than the current data base and enhancedweldability.
3.6. In-service inspection
In-service inspection of sodium systems and components
enhance the plant safety and availability. Sodium cooled fast
reactors, in general, rely on continuous monitoring unlike the
emphasis on periodic inspection in LWRs. The basic features
of in-service inspection are [6]:
 Continuous monitoring of process parameters.
 Materials surveillance coupons.
 Continuous monitoring of primary and secondary sodium
levels.
 Continuous monitoring for leaks in the tubes of steam
generators.
Although the safety criteria and guidelines previously
called for incorporation of provisions to carry out periodic in-
service inspection of IHX tubes, it is a difficult proposition to
practically implement due to associated complexities in
design. IHX tube leaks are detected by level rise in the primary
vessel and thus there is no very sensitive technique for
inferring the tube leak.
The integrity of the bi-metallic joints of steam generator
shell nozzles in CreMo material to the rest of the piping
constructed in austenitic stainless steel (some designs employ
tri-metallic joints to enhance reliability by incorporating an
intermediate nickel base piping spool) are ensured by periodic
ultrasonic examination.
 Considerable experience has been accumulated in eddy
current inspection of steam generator tubes.
 Ultrasonic inspection of steam generator tubes for tube
thicknessmeasurements, and periodic gas pressure testing
of sodium systems have been considered in some SFRs. ASME section XI Division 3 provides rules for in-service
inspection of SFRs.
Safety criteria.
 The design of systems and components shall ensure that
the required in-service inspection can be performed
satisfactorily during the plant design life.
 Adequate instrumentation shall be provided to monitor
plant parameters for different states of reactor operation to
provide information on the status of systems and
components.
Safety guidelines
The following aspects need to be considered:
 Apart from the above, additional substantive/necessary
provisions consistent with best engineering practices need
to be considered at the design stage in terms of component
design (safety classification, construction material, tube
size, and configuration in case of steam generators, for
example, adequate clearances for personal access, adop-
tion of suitable weld geometries in-line with design code
recommendations, decontamination and sodium removal,
repair and replacement, and magnitude of stresses in
comparison to allowable stresses, handling facilities, etc.)4. Discussion
The safety criteria and safety guidelines presented for steam
generation and decay heat removal systems and associated
important construction materials and in-service inspection
state basic SFRs safety requirements that are based on current
state of the art knowledge. These design safety provisions could
be incorporated into evolving newer designs. These safety
criteria and safety guidelines take into account the licensing
rulesof thepast and current approaches, inparticular the safety
design criteria for Generation IV SFR systems, operating expe-
rience of SFRs and the lessons learned. The safety criteria and
guidelines discussed in this paper are particularly useful to new
entrants designing and licensing the first SFR in their country.Conflicts of interest
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